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With the emergence of a global climate youth movement, questions of inter-
generational justice regarding climate change mitigation have come to the45
fore. However, a scientific perspective on intergenerational climate impacts
is still lacking. Here we show that newborns in 2020 are projected to expe-
rience 2–7 times more extreme events globally under current climate pledges
than someone born in 1960, using a novel framework that quantifies impacts
as they are experienced along a person’s lifetime. Limiting warming to 1.5 ◦C50
consistently reduces that burden while still leaving younger generations with
unavoidable impacts that are unmatched by those experienced by older gener-
ations. Our results provide a scientific basis to understand the position from
which younger generations challenge the present shortfall of adequate climate
action.55
Young people around the world have been leading climate demonstrations since late 2018.
This surge in climate protests has received explicit support from many climate scientists (1) and
has been accompanied by the emergence of climate change litigation. Meanwhile, government
actions are falling short of achieving the emission reductions required to halt global warming
at the safe levels agreed upon under the UN Paris Agreement (2). This failure to adequately act60
implies that global warming could easily exceed 3 ◦C by the end of the century (2), and projec-
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tions of future climate change impacts under such scenarios have far-reaching implications (3).
This situation raises important questions about solidarity and fairness across generations (1, 4).
Under continued global warming, extreme events such as heatwaves will continue to rise in
frequency, intensity, duration and spatial extent over the next decades (5–8). Current younger65
generations that will experience those future decades are therefore expected to face more im-
pacts compared to their (grand)parents. However, the ruling paradigm to study climate change
impacts assesses change in discrete time windows or at discrete levels of warming (3). Such an
approach, which we term the Eulerian perspective (in demography called period perspective),
inhibits quantification of exactly how much more impacts from climate change a particular birth70
cohort will experience compared to another generation.
Meteorological extremes, hazards, or climate change impacts are so far mostly studied as
they evolve over time under varying emission scenarios and socio-economic pathways (6, 8, 9).
For instance, applying a heatwave indicator (10) (table S1) to four bias-adjusted global climate
models indicates that the land area annually affected by such heatwaves will increase from75
∼15 % around 2020 to ∼22 % by 2100 under a 1.5 ◦C-compatible scenario and to ∼46 % under
a scenario in line with current emission reduction pledges (fig. 1a). Recent studies extended
this approach by studying aspects of climate change as a function of global mean temperature
(GMT) anomalies, highlighting the scenario-independence of several extreme event indicators
(5, 7, 9) but remaining, in essence, a comparison of two time windows.80
Instead, we here take a Lagrangian (or cohort) perspective to climate change impacts that
measures extreme event exposure over the course of a person’s lifetime. Our intention is thereby
to quantify, in the most robust way possible, the changes in lifetime exposure to climate ex-
tremes across generations. To this end, we perform a birth cohort analysis by combining an un-
precedented collection of multi-model impact projections (7) with country-scale life expectancy85
information (11), gridded population data (12), and future global temperature trajectories (13)
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from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Global Warm-
ing of 1.5 ◦C (see Methods). By integrating the exposure of an average person in a country
or region to extreme events across their lifetime, we encapsulate spatio-temporal changes in
climate hazards, population density, cohort size, and life expectancy (fig. 1).90
Extreme event exposure Our results allow for comparing lifetime exposure to climate ex-
tremes across birth cohorts globally. For example, a person born in 1960 will on average ex-
perience around 4 ±2 (1 σ) heatwaves across their lifetime according to our extreme heatwave
definition (fig. 1b). The lifetime heatwave exposure of this cohort is largely insensitive to the
three future temperature scenarios considered here. A child born in 2020 will, in contrast, ex-95
perience 30 ±9 heatwaves under a scenario following current climate pledges, which could be
reduced to 22 ±7 heatwaves if warming is limited to 2 ◦C or 18 ±8 heatwaves if it is limited to
1.5 ◦C. In any case, that is 7, 6, or 4 times more compared to a person born in 1960. Repeating
this analysis for all cohorts born between 1960 and 2020 highlights clear differences in lifetime
exposure to heatwaves between older and younger cohorts globally (fig. 1c). The effect of al-100
ternative future temperature trajectories on the lifetime exposure multiplication factor becomes
discernible only for cohorts younger than 40 years in 2020, with the largest differences for the
youngest cohorts.
The previous example only uses one impact indicator and a subset of all possible future tem-
perature pathways. We now expand this approach and consider six extreme event categories:105
wildfires, crop failures, droughts, river floods, heatwaves, and tropical cyclones (table S1),
which we analyse under a wide range of temperature pathways that result in future warming
ranging from constant present-day levels up to 3.5 ◦C by 2100 (see Methods and fig. S1). To
this end, we generated a total of 273 global-scale projections with 15 impact models forced by
four bias-adjusted global climate models (table S2). Inspired by the IPCC’s Reasons for Con-110
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cern Framework (3), we visualise the exposure multiplication factors relative to a hypothetical
reference person living under pre-industrial climate conditions as a function of the 2100 GMT
anomaly and cohort (fig. 2). Life expectancy varies with the cohort, whereas the hypothetical
reference person is given the same life expectancy as the oldest cohort in our figures. Therefore,
in contrast to the previous comparison of lifetime exposure across generations given historical115
and climate conditions (Fig. 1), we from now on assess how projected lifetime exposure of birth
cohorts is affected by climate change since pre-industrial and by increased life expectancy since
1960.
Our results highlight that lifetime exposure to each of the considered extreme events con-
sistently increases for higher warming levels and younger cohorts. Changes in extreme event120
frequencies have had relatively little effect on lifetime exposure for cohorts above age 55 in
2020, but this rapidly changes for younger cohorts as they start experiencing extreme events
in the coming years and decades (fig. 2). For a 3 ◦C global warming pathway, a 6-year old in
2020 will experience twice as many wildfires and tropical cyclones, 3 times more river floods,
4 times more crop failures, 5 times more droughts, and 36 times more heatwaves relative to the125
reference person. Such conditions clearly pose a severe threat to the safety of young cohorts.
While qualitatively consistent, quantitative exposure changes differ among categories: for wild-
fires and tropical cyclones, increases in exposure remain limited relative to the other categories,
whereas heatwave exposure increases much more strongly, up to a factor 44 for newborns un-
der 3.5 ◦C of global warming. Aggregating the exposure multiplication factors across the six130
categories shows that people younger than 10 in 2020 will experience about a fourfold increase
in extreme events under 1.5 ◦C of global warming, an increase that older cohorts will never ex-
perience, even if a scenario towards 3.5 ◦C warming is followed (fig. S2a). Under a 3 ◦C global
warming pathway, children under 8 will face an almost fivefold increase in extreme event expo-
sure. These exposure multiplication factors scale robustly with the warming pathway and cohort135
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across a range of aggregation methods, despite some variation in the factor values (fig. S2).
We then calculate the probability of each person’s lifetime exposure occurring under pre-
industrial climate conditions. Lives with an accumulated exposure that would occur with less
than 0.01 % probability under pre-industrial climate (that is, with less than a 1-in-10 000 chance)
are thereby classified as unprecedented. We find that cohorts above age 55 in 2020 will on140
average live an unprecedented life only for heatwaves and crop failures, while cohorts aged 0-
40 in 2020 will additionally face unprecedented exposure to droughts and flooding above 1.5 ◦C
warming (fig. 2a-f). Aggregated across all the impact categories, lifetime exposure to extremes
is unprecedented at all warming levels and cohorts (fig. S2a).
Regional patterns Behind this global average picture, there are important spatial variations.145
Repeating the analysis for a selection of world regions (fig. S3) reveals marked differences
between regions (figs. S4–S5), while a country-level assessment highlights even stronger spatial
disparities (Supplementary Note 1; figs. S6–7). We find a particularly strong increase in lifetime
exposure across the Middle East and North Africa, with on average at least 7 times higher
exposure for all cohorts younger than 25 years in 2020 under current pledges (fig. S8a). In sub-150
Saharan Africa, newborns will on average experience 5.9 times more extreme events compared
to a reference person living under pre-industrial climate, while newborns in other regions will
on average experience 3.7–5.3 times more extremes. This burden on newborns in terms of
additional exposure to extreme events is substantially reduced when limiting global warming
to 1.5 ◦C: the strongest reductions in exposure are found in the Middle East and North Africa155
(-39%), Europe and Central Asia (-28%), and North America (-26%), while benefits in Sub-
Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific roughly correspond to the global average (-24%).
Grouping countries by income category instead of by region highlights that young gen-
erations in low-income countries will face by far the strongest increases in lifetime exposure
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with a more than fivefold increase for newborns under current pledges (fig. S8b). High-income160
countries, on the other hand, face the smallest increases for younger cohorts and the smallest
variation across generations. However, while 60-year old people in high-income countries rep-
resent 22% of their cohort globally, this fraction has reduced to 10% for newborns (fig. S9-10).
The corresponding relative cohort sizes of low-income countries, on the contrary, increased
from 5% to 18%. Thus, children born in the present and future are much more likely to be born165
in regions facing the highest increase in lifetime extreme event exposure. For example, 53 mil-
lion children born in Europe and Central Asia between 2016 and 2020 will experience 3.8–4.0
times more extreme events under current pledges, but 172 million children of the same age in
sub-Saharan Africa face a factor 5.5–5.9 increase in lifetime extreme event exposure, including
a factor 50–54 increase in lifetime heatwave exposure (fig. S9-10). This combined rapid growth170
in cohort size and extreme event exposure (fig. S9-12) highlights a disproportionate climate
change burden for young generations in the Global South.
Improvements in life expectancy (fig. 1a; fig. S13) represent a confounding factor in the
signal of increasing exposure to extreme events over a person’s lifetime. However, we find
that globally, climate change explains 98% of a newborn’s exposure change under the current175
pledges scenario (fig. S14, see Methods). In high-income countries, the enhanced exposure
of a newborn is almost entirely attributable to climate change (99%), whereas in low, lower-
middle and upper-middle income countries, climate change contributes 98% of the total expo-
sure change (figs. S14–S15).
Discussion Analysis of climate risks to humans has traditionally considered impacts as they180
evolve over time. Our Lagrangian approach provides a more intuitive account of climate im-
pacts by tracking exposure to extreme events across a person’s lifetime and comparing changes
across generations. While we comprehensively account for hazards and exposure using an
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unprecedented climate impact modeling effort (7, 12) and within-country population density
variability, there are multiple reasons to think that our approach, if anything, underestimates185
intergenerational differences in exposure (Supplementary Note 2).
Further work could aim at extending this novel approach to include further demographic
dimensions and vulnerability (14). Vulnerability to extreme events depends on a range of socio-
economic factors but may also evolve over the course of a lifetime. A young person may for
instance experience little health impacts from a heatwave compared to older people (15), but190
schooling infrastructure destroyed by a tropical cyclone may have a disproportionate detrimen-
tal effect on children’s education which could persist throughout their entire lifetime. And while
communities may possibly become less vulnerable to extreme events over time, limits to adap-
tive capacity remain even under optimistic pathways beyond mid-century (14) (Supplementary
Note 3).195
Climate change impacts may also engender migration and ultimately even affect life ex-
pectancy via increased mortality, two aspects which are not considered in this study. Even
though climate change increases mortality (15), it is currently not included in life expectancy
estimates and population projections like the ones we use here. Likewise, migration triggered
by environmental degradation may change both exposure and vulnerability to extreme events.200
Further analysis should therefore aim at systematically integrating population dynamics and
climate risk assessments to better understand the long-term impacts of extreme climate events
and to improve socioeconomic scenario development.
Our results overall highlight the strong benefits of aligning policies with the Paris Agree-
ment for safeguarding the future of current young generations. While all generations younger205
than 60 in 2020 will live unprecedented lives in terms of extreme event exposure, lifetime expo-
sure to climate change impacts drastically increases for younger generations as global warming
progresses. Heatwaves dominate the escalating exposure to hazards, but a consistent rise is
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also observed for droughts, wildfires, tropical cyclones, crop failures as well as flooding. The
strongest increases occur in low income countries where strongly rising extreme events (8) af-210
fect a rapidly growing young population. Overall, limiting global warming to 1.5 ◦C instead
of following the current pledges scenario nearly halves (-40%) the additional exposure of new-
borns to extreme heatwaves and substantially reduces the burden for wildfires (-11%), crop
failures (-27%), droughts (-28%), tropical cyclones (-29%), and river floods (-34%). These
findings have direct implications for climate litigation and call for ambitious mitigation efforts215
to improve intergenerational and international justice.
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Figure 1: From an Eulerian (period) to a Lagrangian (cohort) perspective on climate
change impacts. (a) Historical and future evolution of global land area fraction annually ex-
posed to heatwaves under a 1.5 ◦C, 2 ◦C, and current pledges scenario. Each line represents the
multi-model mean of a heatwave metric calculated from the four bias-adjusted global climate
models available in ISIMIP2b (see Methods and table S1). All lines were smoothed using a
10-point moving average and the uncertainty band spans 1 standard deviation across the model
ensemble. Horizontal grey arrows indicate the global-average lifespan of a person born in 1960
and 2020, respectively. (b) Lifetime heatwave exposure for the 1960 and 2020 birth cohort,
respectively, under the three scenarios. The rotated factors above each bar indicate the exposure
multiplication factor relative to the 1960 birth cohort under the respective scenario. (c) Expo-
sure multiplication factors for lifetime heatwave exposure across birth cohorts relative to the
exposure of the 1960 birth cohort under the respective scenario. Uncertainty bands represent
model uncertainty as the inter-quartile range for the 2020 birth cohort exposure relative to the
multi-model mean exposure of the 1960 birth cohort.
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Figure 2: lifetime exposure on the rise. Exposure multiplication factors across birth cohorts
(x-axis) under a range of global warming trajectories (fig. S1) reaching 0.87 ◦C to 3.5 ◦C global
mean temperature (GMT) anomalies in 2100 relative to the pre-industrial (PI) reference period
(1850–1900; y-axis) for (a) wildfires, (b) crop failures, (c) droughts, (d) river floods, (e) heat-
waves, and (f) tropical cyclones. All factors are computed relative to the mean exposure of
a hypothetical reference person living under pre-industrial climate conditions with year-1960
life expectancy, and therefore incorporate the effect of historical as well as projected climate
change. The grey contour delineates lifetime extreme event exposure with 0.01 % probability
of occurrence under pre-industrial climate conditions; absence of the contour indicates that this
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Materials and Methods
The aim of this study is to quantify, in the most robust way possible, the global- and regional-5
scale increase in exposure to climate extremes for younger generations. To this end, we integrate
the exposure of an average member of a birth cohort to extreme events across their lifetime and
subsequently compare these results across cohorts and regions. This is achieved by combining
five sources of data, which are explained hereafter.
Employed data First, we developed the largest multi-model climate impact projections database10
available to date as part of the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project phase 2b
(ISIMIP2b) (16). Following the ISIMIP2b protocol, we performed simulations with 15 im-
pact models that represent variables relevant for the six extreme event categories described
below (CARAIB (17), LPJ-GUESS (18), LPJmL (19, 20), ORCHIDEE (21), VISIT (22, 23),
GEPIC (24), PEPIC (25, 26), CLM4.5 (27, 28), H08 (29), JULES-W1 (30), MPI-HM (31, 32),15
PCR-GLOBWB (33,34), WaterGAP2 (35,36), HWMId-humidex (37), and KE-TG (38)). These
process-based models represent the state of the art of global-scale hydrological, vegetation,
agricultural, land surface, heat stress, and tropical cyclone modeling (39–45). Each model pro-
vides relevent biophysical impact variables such as runoff, crop yields, or soil moisture at a
spatial resolution of 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ and at daily to annual time scales. The impact models are20
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each driven by up to four downscaled and bias-adjusted (46) global climate models (GCMs;
GFDL-ESM2M (47), HadGEM2-ES (48), IPSL-CM5A-LR (49), and MIROC5 (50)) partic-
ipating in the fifth phase (51) of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5) under
pre-industrial, historical, and RCP 2.6, 6.0 and 8.5 climate forcings. GCMs are designed to cap-
ture the spatially-explicit climate response to rising greenhouse gas concentrations and other an-25
thropogenic forcings; as such, they are the cornerstone of scientific knowledge on future climate
change. Here, the four GCMs were selected based on data availability and representativeness
of the entire CMIP5 ensemble (see Supplementary Note 4 for a detailed description of the se-
lection, downscaling, and bias adjustment procedure). Besides transient historical and future
climate information, our simulations represent other human influences via input data mimick-30
ing historical socioeconomic development until 2005 and assuming fixed year-2005 conditions
thereafter. Overall, our impact data set consists of 273 global-scale impact projections spanning
the period 1861–2099 (table S2) and 101 pre-industrial control simulations covering on average
542 years each. A more detailed description of the data is provided in (37).
Second, we employ data on life expectancy at the age of 5 available from the United Nations35
World Population Prospects (52), indicating the number of years a 5-year old would be expected
to live if mortality patterns prevailing at the time of observation (year to which this period
indicator pertains) were to remain constant throughout their lifetimes. The data is available at
the country, regional, and global scale (fig. S3) in 5-year blocks for 1950-1955 to 2015-2020.
From this data, we calculate cohort life expectancy at birth which adjusts for child mortality 0-440
because child mortality distorts the pattern that shall be studied. First, we translate the data to
annual values using linear interpolation, assume the life expectancy value is representative for
the middle year of the 5-year block, and linearly extrapolate life expectancy from 2017 to 2025
in every country. To capture the entire length of the life span starting with birth, we subsequently
add 5 years and assign the value to the birth year of the respective cohort, thereby assuming that45
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this value represents life expectancy at birth excluding child mortality. Finally, we translate
this indicator from period to cohort life expectancy by adding 6 years to the value of the period
life expectancy estimate at birth (53). This is based on a rather conservative assumption of
future increases in life expectancy given the current uncertainty about future mortality trends.
We note that that this life expectancy data ignores impacts from climate change. Our approach50
thus follows UN fertility and mortality projections, but omits climate change feedbacks on
population dynamics.
Third, future GMT trajectories are derived from scenarios compiled in support of the IPCC
Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 ◦C (SR1.5) (54, 55) and were subsequently made
available through the Integrated Assessment Modeling Consortium and the International In-55
stitute for Applied Systems Analysis (56, 57). We select three marker scenarios: two sce-
narios limiting global warming to 1.5 ◦C and 2.0 ◦C above pre-industrial levels (58), respec-
tively, and a third scenario consistent with current (2020) Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs) – also referred to as the current pledges scenario (fig. S1). The 1.5 ◦C and NDC scenar-
ios (originally labelled ‘MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.0 LowEnergyDemand’ and ‘MESSAGE-60
GLOBIOM 1.0 ADVANCE INDC’, respectively) were developed with the Integrated Assess-
ment Model MESSAGE-GLOBIOM version 1.0 (59). The 2.0 ◦C scenario was derived using
IMAGE version 3.0.1 (60). The 2 ◦C compatible scenario is assessed by the IPCC SR1.5 to keep
warming below 2 ◦C with at least 66 % probability, whereas the 1.5 ◦C scenario limits warm-
ing to 1.5 ◦C with 50 % probability but potentially exceeds this level temporarily by less than65
0.1 ◦C (54). The GMT anomalies in 2091–2100 compared to the pre-industrial reference period
(1850–1900) are 1.4 ◦C, 1.7 ◦C and 2.4 ◦C for the 1.5 ◦C, the 2.0 ◦C and the current pledges
scenario, respectively (fig. S1).
Fourth, gridded population reconstructions and projections are obtained from the ISIMIP2b
input data repository. Historical reconstructions are based on version 3.2 of the History Database70
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of the Global Environment (HYDE3.2) (61) while future projections are derived from a gravity-
based downscaling model (62) under the Middle-of-the-Road Shared Socioeconomic Pathway
2 (SSP2) (63). Social and economic trends of the SSP2 scenario do not markedly shift from
the historical trends. Most countries complete the demographic transition, and the population
growth levels off in the second half of the century. Under SSP2, all countries in the world are75
projected to develop with medium fertility, mortality and migration trends (64). The gridded
future population projections account for population growth, urbanization level, and spatial ur-
banization pattern by incorporating variations of these patterns across regions and SSPs (62).
For population change, countries are categorized according to fertility and income into three
groups (high fertility, low fertility with high incomes, and low fertility), whereas for urbaniza-80
tion, countries are grouped based on income alone (Low, Medium and High income). While
population density evolves over time according to these drivers, climate-induced changes in mi-
gration, urbanisation, fertility, and mortality are not considered in this data set, and therefore not
in our approach. We analysed the uncertainty associated with the gridded population data by
testing the sensitivity of our results to using gridded population projections under an alternative85
SSP. Using SSP3 – a pathway considered inconsistent with RCP2.6 – instead of SSP2 showed
little sensitivity of the results to the SSP choice, reflecting the fact that our analysis builds on
within-country relative population density variability rather that on absolute population totals.
Finally, we use country-scale cohort size data provided by the Wittgenstein Centre and avail-
able through its Human Capital Data Explorer (65). We consider cohort sizes of the year 202090
and linearly interpolate the 5-year block data to annual time scale, assuming the cohort size
value to be valid for the center year of the block.
Extreme event definition. A detailed description of the processing of the ISIMIP2b simula-
tions is provided in Ref. (37) and summarised hereafter. We consider 6 extreme event categories:
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wildfires, crop failure, droughts, river floods, heatwaves, and tropical cyclones. We select these95
six extreme event categories because we know from existing studies (16, 66) that these hazards
(i) will increase in frequency, intensity, and/or duration with projected climate change, (ii) can
lead to strong impacts when they occur, and (iii) can be tackled comprehensively in a modelling
framework such as ISIMIP. For each category and simulated calendar year, we compute the land
fraction per grid cell exposed at least once to an extreme event as defined in table S1. As such,100
the land fraction annually exposed to extreme events becomes a comparable quantity across
event categories.
Since the 8 considered global hydrological models do not provide flood extent and apply dif-
ferent routing schemes (67), we employ the global-scale river routing model CaMa-Flood (68)
to compute the land area exposed to river flooding using daily gridded runoff from the global105
hydrological models as input (table S2). For tropical cyclones, we use the average exposure
over a 100-member ensemble of tropical cyclone tracks downscaled from GCM output (38).
While the strongest increases in tropical cyclone impacts are expected from increasing cyclone
intensities (38, 69), our projections also show a rise in tropical cyclone frequency under con-
tinued warming, consistent with (37, 38). For wildfires, we quantify the pure climate change110
effect on burned area using a suite of global vegetation models (see Supplementary Note 5 for
more details). A grid cell is considered to be exposed to a heatwave in a given year if the
Heat Wave Magnitude Index daily (HWMId) (70,71) of that year exceeds the 99th percentile of
the HWMId distribution under pre-industrial climate conditions of that grid cell. For droughts,
heatwaves, and crop failure, we define the extreme event occurrence based on the exceedance of115
a pre-industrial percentile threshold (table S1). While the exact percentile value is an arbitrary
choice, the approach allows for a robust estimation of the threshold values thanks to the long
time span of the pre-industrial control simulations. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis with mul-
tiple heatwave definitions showed only little sensitivity of the relative exposure changes at the
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global scale, suggesting a limited influence of the choice of the pre-industrial percentile value120
on the analysis of the historical and future impact model simulations. Finally, we also analyse
lifetime cold spell exposure, which we define as the counterpart of heatwaves (see Supplemen-
tary Note 6).
Exposure calculation. In this study, we integrate the exposure of an average person in any
country or region to climate impacts across their lifetime. This cohort analysis considers land125
areas only and is performed across 178 countries (fig. S6), 11 regions (fig. S3) and the globe.
We first compute country-scale spatial averages of annual land area exposure weighted by
population totals of the corresponding year over all available historical, RCP 2.6, 6.0 and 8.5
simulations. This way, our exposure assessment accounts for temporal changes in population
density under a Middle-of-the-Road scenario. The resulting time series is then mapped onto130
the SR1.5 scenarios (1.5 ◦C, 2 ◦C and NDCs, respectively) by selecting from the concatenated
historical-RCP series the year with the GMT anomaly closest to the annual anomaly in each
SR1.5 scenario, thereby effectively using the ISIMIP2b impact simulations as damage func-
tions (time-shift approach (72, 73); fig. 1a). While the analysis can also be performed directly
on the RCPs, we decide to apply the time-shift approach because (i) of the increasing pol-135
icy relevance of low-end warming scenarios like the 1.5◦ and 2◦-compatible scenarios; (ii) the
ISIMIP2b framework only samples a small set of greenhouse gas concentration pathways (i.e.
three RCPs), whereas we here analyse a range of potential warming scenarios (see below),
(iii) to better align biophysical impact projections arising from climate models with different
transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE). Both in ISIMIP2b and the140
SR1.5 scenarios, GMT anomalies are computed using the 1850-1900 historical period (51-year
average) as reference (37, 74). Simulations whereby the absolute GMT difference with the
SR1.5 scenario in any year exceeds 0.2 ◦C are excluded to avoid that low-end RCP projections
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(e.g. RCP 2.6) inform high-end warming scenarios (e.g. current pledges). Our assumption
that the simulated impacts are scenario-independent is generally valid for the considered ex-145
treme event categories (37) and allows us to maximise the impact information considered in
each SR1.5 scenario. That said, some aspects of these extreme events show a lagged response
to global mean temperature increase, making our assessment conservative (see Supplementary
Note 2).
Next, we accumulate for each simulation, country and birth year within the period 1960-150
2020 the extreme event exposure across an average life span in that country. As life expectancy
extends up to the year 2113 in some countries and birth cohorts, we assume that beyond 2099,
annually exposed land fractions, GMT anomalies and gridded population densities are constant
at the 2090-2099 average. In contrast, for some spatial units and early birth years, the life
expectancy at birth may not extend until 2020; for those individuals still alive in 2020 the155
lifetime exposure accounts for the average, not actual life span. To obtain lifetime exposure
values at the regional and global scale, we compute for each birth cohort the weighted spatial
average of the country-scale exposure using the size of that particular cohort in each country
as weighing factor. Analogous to the well-established distinction between the Eulerian and
Lagrangian perspective in atmospheric science and between the period and cohort approach in160
demography, we suggest that the resulting lifetime extreme event exposure values represent the
Lagrangian/cohort view on climate change impacts.
Computing the multi-model arithmetic mean per extreme impact category then enables the
comparison of different birth cohorts (fig. 1b), whereby the results combine the effect of changes
in extreme event occurrence as a consequence of climate change and the change in life ex-165
pectancy in that spatial entity.
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Exposure multiplication factor. To analyse the lifetime exposure data, we use the exposure





where Eref is the lifetime exposure of a person born in the reference year 1960 – that is, all170
people being 60 years old on 31 December 2020 – and Enew is the lifetime exposure of a person
born in a later year. This metric allows us to compare birth cohorts across a range of birth
years (fig. 1c). For instance, an EMF of 2 for a newborn and Eref of 3.5 heatwaves implies
that a person born in a given country in 1960 will on average face 3.5 heatwaves across their
lifetime, whereas a person born in 2020 on will on average face 7 heatwaves. To avoid EMF175
values being infinite, we assign the value of 100 in the exceptional cases when extreme events
emerge in a country or region. The EMF metric relates to the probability ratio metric used in
previous studies (75–77), where the probability ratio is generally used as a ratio of frequencies
of occurrence with probabilities limited to [0, 1] by definition. However, the EMF metric is
a ratio of event counts (not of event probabilities), and explicitly includes exposure next to180
hazards, thereby moving towards more comprehensive risk definitions (76).
We consider three approaches to aggregate the information across extreme event categories.
The first method computes the geometric mean across the EMF per event category. In this ap-
proach, percent changes in each of the categories equally contribute to the total change, but the
approach yields conservative estimates in spatial units not affected by one or several categories185
under past and future conditions (e.g., tropical cyclones in high-latitude countries). Uncertain-
ties in this approach are computed as the geometric mean of the per-category EMF computed
based on the ensemble’s 25th and 75th percentile lifetime exposure relative to the multi-model
mean exposure under pre-industrial climate conditions. The second approach is to calculate the
geometric mean of the lifetime exposure across the six considered event categories and sub-190
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sequently compute the EMF . The third approach is to compute the harmonic mean across
the EMF per event category. The harmonic mean is suited for computing the mean across
ratios (such as the EMF ) and is the most conservative of the Pythagorean means. Note that
the arithmetic mean or the sum are not considered here because the results would be dominated
by the strong increase in heatwave occurrence. The sensitivity to the aggregation procedure195
is visualised in fig. S2; while the first and third aggregation method yield consistent results,
the second approach yields substantially higher exposure estimates. Taking a conservative ap-
proach, all further cross-category results are based on the first aggregation method.
Exposure scaling with GMT. To derive the EMFs shown in fig. 2, we first construct 28
stylised GMT trajectories. The trajectories are obtained through piecewise linear interpola-200
tion between five scenarios: a present-day constant temperature (taken here as the 2009 GMT
anomaly of 0.87 ◦C), a linear temperature increase from 0.87 ◦C in 2009 to 3.5 ◦C by 2100, and
the three SR1.5 scenarios (1.5 ◦C, 2 ◦C, NDC). The resulting scenarios thereby cover, in 2100,
the 0.87 – 3.5 ◦C GMT anomaly range with a 0.1 ◦C increment (fig. S1).
For each pathway, we subsequently compute the lifetime exposure per spatial unit and event205
category following the methodology explained above. As reference for the EMF calcula-
tion, we consider the average exposure of a person with year-1960 life expectancy under pre-
industrial climate conditions. To this end, we first compute, for each of the 101 pre-industrial
control simulations, the lifetime exposure for 100 bootstrapped time series. We then pool the
resulting exposure values for all available simulations within that extreme event category, and210
calculate the arithmetic mean from the resulting distribution. The pre-industrial control expo-
sure thereby samples from one distribution comprising uncertainty from both internal variability
and structural climate and impact model deficiencies.
Once the EMF is calculated per extreme event category, the multi-event EMF is obtained
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by computing the geometric mean across the EMF values per category (see above). The re-215
sulting EMF values are subsequently smoothed using a three-element moving average along
the vertical and visualised in fig. 2. Note that in fig. 2, uncertainty increases along the y-axis
as fewer impact projections are available to sample from towards higher warming levels. This
sampling artefact explains the apparent reduction in droughts and river floods EMF for some
cohorts above 3◦C warming relative to pre-industrial (fig. 2c-d).220
Next to the EMF , we also analyse the probability of experiencing, under pre-industrial
climate conditions, the lifetime exposure values obtained under the stylised pathways. To this
end, we calculate the empirical inverse percentiles from the pre-industrial control distribution of
the lifetime exposure under each of the stylised GMT trajectories. To obtain the pre-industrial
exposure distribution aggregated across the six extreme event categories, we first select 1 000225
random combinations of one simulation per extreme event category and subsequently com-
pute in each combination the geometric mean EMF across the categories. Since each random
combination consists of 100 lifetime exposure values obtained via bootstrapping (see above),
this yields a distribution of 100 000 lifetime exposure values. Like with the EMF fields, the
resulting probability fields are smoothed using a three-element moving average along the ver-230
tical, except for tropical cyclones, where a fourth-order polynomial is fitted to the threshold
probability contour to account for the higher uncertainties in these projections obtained from a
single impact model. The results are visualised as grey contours in fig. 2 and denote the 99.99th
percentile, that is, above and right of these contours, one has less than 0.01 % probability of
living such life under pre-industrial climate conditions. We refer to the latter case as living an235
unprecedented life.
With the exception of wildfires and tropical cyclones, our extreme events are defined based
on extreme percentiles estimated from the pre-industrial control simulations (table S1) (37).
Due to a statistical artefact (78, 79), the expected relative frequency of exceedance of those
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percentiles (or of falling below for the 2.5th crop yield and soil moisture percentiles) may po-240
tentially be larger in data that was not used to estimate the percentiles (such as data from the
historical simulations and the future scenario simulations) than in the pre-industrial control
data. However, we believe that this issue can be disregarded in our analysis, because (i) we use
a very large sample of pre-industrial control simulations (542 years on average) to estimate the
percentile values in each simulation, and (ii) our analysis consists of relative changes between245
cohort lifespans that all fall entirely outside of the base period.
While fig. 2 is inspired by the burning ember diagrams shown in various IPCC reports
(80–82), we acknowledge that our results cannot be directly translated into this risk framework,
primarily because we only consider 2 dimensions of risk in our assessment, that is, hazard and
exposure. Further work could aim at including vulnerability into the assessment, for instance by250
incorporating vulnerability projections and associated adaptation potentials (83) in the analysis.
Life expectancy versus climate change. To isolate the contribution of life expectancy change
to the total change in lifetime exposure, we repeat the lifetime exposure calculation but apply it
to the pre-industrial control simulations (see details below; figs. S14–S15). Assuming this term
corresponds to the pure life expectancy effect in the absence of climate change, the residual255
represents the contribution from climate change.
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Supplementary Notes
Supplementary Note 1 – Country-level analysis
Breaking the analysis down to country scale highlights strong spatial disparities (figs. S6–7).
Lifetime heatwave exposure for the 2020 birth cohort relative to the 1960 birth cohort increases260
in every country in the world and under all future scenarios considered (fig. S6a-b). However,
in several countries the 2020 birth cohort will face more than 10 times as many extreme heat-
waves compared to the 1960 birth cohort under current pledges. This is for instance the case
in countries in Central Africa, the Middle East and West and Southeast Asia. Under a 1.5 ◦C
scenario, these multiplication factors are often substantially reduced. Similar patterns emerge265
for the other extreme event categories (fig. S7), though the multiplication factors are subject to
higher uncertainty and in some cases indicate reduced exposure, for instance in exposure to crop
failures in several Eurasian countries under 1.5 ◦C warming. Aggregated across all categories,
most countries ultimately show a decrease in the exposure multiplication factor going from the
current pledges scenario to 1.5 ◦C of global warming (fig. S6c-d), highlighting a clear incentive270
for younger generations of limiting global warming to 1.5 ◦C instead of the 2.6–3.1 ◦C expected
from current pledges (84, 85).
Our drought definition is based on the frequency of occurrence of extremely low monthly
soil moisture values during at least seven consecutive months (table S1) as computed by 8 global
vegetation models and global hydrological models from the ISIMIP biomes and water sector, re-275
spectively (CLM4.5, H08, LPJmL, JULES-W1, MPI-HM, ORCHIDEE, PCR-GLOBWB, and
WaterGAP2; table S2). Thus, we mechanistically account for changes in both precipitation
and evapotranspiration in our drought projections. If precipitation increases in a region ac-
cording to a GCM projection, the impact simulation driven by this GCM might project less
droughts. This is, for instance, the case in Russia under 1.5◦C warming and current pledges,280
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and in parts of Scandinavia under 1.5◦C warming (fig. S7e-f). But if the evapotranspiration
increase is larger than the precipitation increase (especially during the dry season), drought fre-
quency may increase despite projected increases in precipitation, like is the case in East Africa
(fig. S7e-f) (86,87). This also explains why one region may face an increase in exposure to both
droughts and river floods (e.g. Southern Africa and large parts of Asia; fig. S7e-h).285
Supplementary Note 2 – Why our estimates may be considered conserva-
tive
Our approach yields conservative lifetime exposure estimates for at least six reasons. First, it
treats consecutive extreme events (88) affecting a specific location within a calendar year as one,
leading to an underestimation of the number of events in present-day as well as their increase290
in frequency. Second, it only considers changes in the frequency of extreme events, neglecting
possible increases in event intensity and duration (71). For tropical cyclones, for instance, pro-
jected increases in storm intensity can be considered equally important (38), whereas heatwave
duration and intensity are increasing next to heatwave frequency (89). Third, we do not take
into account the effects of compounding extremes, even though, for instance, severe droughts,295
heatwaves and crop failures tend to co-occur (88,90–93). Fourth, we only consider exposure to
local hazards, yet extreme events such as crop failures may lead to regional or even global food
price instability when occurring in isolation or concurrently (81,92,94). Fifth, we employ strin-
gent definitions of extreme events, with for instance heatwaves occurring only about four times
in a lifetime on average for the 1960 birth cohort (fig. 1b). Several extreme event categories300
therefore occur only over part of the globe (37), leading to an underrepresented risk when ag-
gregating across extreme event categories. Finally, some aspects of the extreme event categories
we consider demonstrate a lagged response to global warming. This notably applies for tropical
cyclones, which cause substantial impacts via the storm surge they generate. These storm surges
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are amplified by background sea level rise (95) which lags the global mean temperature increase305
by decades to centuries (96, 97). This lagged response further augments inter-generational in-
equity, and this to the extent that even the already committed sea level rise will enhance lifetime
exposure of generations well beyond the ones we consider in this study (96, 97). On shorter
time scales, this reasoning also applies to wildfires, as fuel aridity may build up over several
years in response to a long-term warming trend (98). Overall, these six reasons highlight that310
our current results may underestimate changes in actual extreme event exposure and thereby
underscore the benefits of climate action for current and future young generations.
Supplementary Note 3 – Vulnerability, impacts and adaptation
Our study is deliberately limited to exposure to climate hazards, given that both adaptation over
time and age-dependent vulnerability are extremely difficult to quantify. In that sense, we com-315
pute changes in the hazards that people face throughout their lifetime (e.g. a heatwave or a river
flood), but make no call about the risk or impact which they generate (e.g. mortality, infrastruc-
ture damage). By altering their vulnerabilities, communities can also adapt to the changes in
exposure to hazards. For the extreme event categories considered here, these adaptation options
can take many forms: e.g. changing crop types, agricultural management (irrigation, fertiliser),320
flood protection, reservoir deployment and management, fire management, and improved warn-
ing systems. Depending on the adaptation options that communities will (be able to) choose,
the level of risk arising from the hazard exposure will vary.
While adaptive capacities may increase over time, extreme events result in detrimental im-
pacts already today, even in developed countries with very high adaptive capacity (see, for325
instance, the 2019-2020 wildfires in California and Australia). Moreover, for many develop-
ing countries, increased adaptive capacity is needed to address today’s climate risks – it does
not imply that these countries can cope with unprecedented future hazards even under very
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optimistic scenarios of socio-economic development. Recent research showed that adaptive ca-
pacities are far from uniformly rising Andrijevic2020a and that it will take until well into the330
21st century for many developing countries to reach current OECD levels. Overall, there are
huge differences in adaptive capacities between countries with no signs that this gap will drasti-
cally reduce in the next decades, and even in countries with high adaptive capacities, it is unsure
whether entire populations will be able to adapt to severe climate change impacts. Finally, we
note the existence of quite hard (physiological) limits to adaptation for several of the extreme335
events considered in this study. For instance, a wet-bulb temperature of 35◦C defines the limit
of human survivability (99–101). In other cases, migration may be the final adaptation option,
which may in turn change both exposure and vulnerability to (a set of) hazards. For instance, a
poor Ugandan farmer migrating to the Capital to escape from increasing crop failure may end
up settling in one of Kampala’s informal settlements which are very prone to flooding, heat340
stress, and vector-borne diseases (102, 103).
Overall, the aspect of changing vulnerability and adaptive capacity requires careful consid-
eration and the absence of a framework to quantitatively integrate future vulnerabilities into
climate risk scenarios is why our analysis focuses explicitly on exposure to climate hazards
instead of climate risk.345
A cohort-based approach raises the question about its relationship to discounting over time
to adequately account and weigh intergenerational interests. However, the concept of discount-
ing does not apply to our study given its focus on extreme event exposure instead of climate
change impacts. Discounting is commonly used as a methodological approach within cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). Yet, our cohort-based extreme event exposure differs from the CBA350
frameworks, because it only maps out the consequences and uncertainties of different future
climate change pathways in terms of extreme event exposure. Incorporating an exposure per-
spective, such as ours, within a CBA would require to value the exposures and aggregate them
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into a cost or welfare metric, since discounting can only be applied to value and welfare metrics.
Such aggregation – including the discounting – implicitly assumes that exposures between dif-355
ferent groups are comparable and, therefore, trade-offs can be resolved. In principle, the results
of the extreme event exposures can serve as input to such analysis, but it requires to value the
exposures and aggregate them.
Next to informing a CBA, the extreme event exposure results could also inform a rights-
based approach. Rights-based approaches argue for “a general right against risking” (104).360
Rights-based approaches are related to the precautionary principle and relate future risks im-
plied by current action to the infringement on future opportunities and the exercising of basic
rights.
In recent years, climate change and the risks for future generations has been increasingly
brought to courts. The cohort-based extreme event exposure approach can help to inform this365
debate. However, we refrain from suggesting criteria or requirements that should be applied to
derive the level of climate change. A comprehensive consideration of competing rights would
need to take a broader set of rights into account and could not only rely on extreme event
exposure. The priorities of competing rights and the weighing of competing rights requires a
broader decision analysis framework that is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Finally,370
the methodological difference between CBA- and rights-based approaches does not necessarily
imply a stronger or weaker level of future climate change and therefore higher or lower near
term emissions. This is partly due to the sensitivity of CBA results to the choice of the discount
rate (105) and the role competing rights can play.
Supplementary Note 4 – GCM selection and bias-adjustment procedure375
Global Climate Models (GCMs) allow to simulate climate and weather extremes under histor-
ical and future atmospheric conditions. The ISIMIP2b climate forcing builds on a selection of
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GCM output from the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5) (106).
The ISIMIP2b forcing data covers four of the CMIP5 GCMs (IPSL-CM5A-LR, HadGEM2-ES,
MIROC5, GFDL-ESM2M). Uncertainty of future greenhouse gas emissions is spanned through380
scenarios, which are the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (107) used in CMIP5
and consequently in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report. In support for the IPCC Special
Report on global warming of 1.5 ◦C, ISIMIP2b covered initially RCP2.6 and RCP6.0, a low
emission and an intermediate stabilization scenario, with the high emission RCP8.5 scenario
added at a later stage, leading to a lower impact simulation availability (see table S2 for the385
scenarios covered by each impact model). The four GCMs were selected by availability of
variables necessary for impact modeling and their position in the distribution of equilibrium
climate sensitivity (ECS) in the CMIP5 ensemble. With an ECS of 4.1 ◦C for IPSL-CM5A-
LR, 4.6 ◦C for HadGEM2-ES, 2.7 ◦C for MIROC5 and 2.4 ◦C for GFDL-ESM2M, the GCM
selection includes two models at the lower and two at the upper end of the CMIP5 ensemble390
range (2.1 ◦C to 4.7 ◦C). The climate model data is regridded from its original resolution to
the ISIMIP impact model grid at a spatial resolution of 0.5◦ × 0.5◦. The climate model data
is bias-adjusted (16, 46) to better represent the statistical distribution of observational weather
data while preserving simulated trends. In addition, we use sub-daily output of the GCMs listed
above that is not bias adjusted to force the high-resolution tropical-cyclone model.395
Supplementary Note 5 – Wildfire simulations
The global burned area has seen a decrease in recent years, with the decrease explained mostly
by a decrease in the number of fires associated with agricultural expansion (108, 109). In this
study, the wildfire simulations are designed to quantify the pure climate change effect on wild-
fire activity. To this end, we compute the change in burned area purely from a change in climate400
implemented via the GCM forcing, while keeping cropland area, population levels and other
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socioeconomic factors constant at 2005 levels. The vegetation models used here are suited
for this type of analyses since their fire modules generally do not include human ignition (ex-
cept for ORCHIDEE in which ignition depends on population density, with population density
kept constant after 2005 in our simulation design). In addition, a historical land use-induced405
negative trend in burned area does not preclude that exposure to wildfire activity may rise in
the next decades. Regional increases in wildfire activity have already been attributed to an-
thropogenic climate change (98) and fire weather is projected to substantially intensify in the
coming decades (110). Moreover, exposure to fire may increase due to population expansion
in fire-prone regions, an effect which may even outweigh changes in burned area (111). We410
account for this effect thanks to the use of annual gridded population density projections when
spatially averaging the hazard maps. Combining our simulated climate-induced burned area
changes with projected population density data suggest a clear increase wildfire exposure de-
spite substantial uncertainties, corroborating a recent IPCC assessment of rising wildfire dam-
age risk under continued global warming (81, 82).415
Supplementary Note 6 – Cold spells
Next to the six extreme event categories considered in this study, the influence on climate change
on cold spell exposure could also be considered. To this end, we consider a grid cell to be
exposed to a cold spell in a given year if the Cold Wave Magnitude Index daily (CWMId) of
that year exceeds the 99th percentile of the CWMId distribution under pre-industrial climate420
conditions of that grid cell. We define the CWMId as the maximum magnitude of all cold
periods occurring in a year, where a cold period is a period of at least six consecutive days with
daily maximum temperature falling below a threshold value Tpi10 which is defined as the 10th
percentile of daily maximum temperatures under pre-industrial climate conditions, centered
on a 31-day window. The magnitude of each cold period in a year is the sum of the daily425
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magnitudes on the consecutive days composing the cold period, with daily magnitude calculated
according to Md(Td) = 0 if Td ≥ Tpi75 else (Tpi75 − Td)/(Tpi75 − Tpi25), where Td is the daily
maximum temperature on day d of the cold period and Tpi25 and Tpi75 are the 25th and 75th
percentile, respectively, of the annual minimum of the daily maximum temperature under pre-
industrial climate conditions. To estimate Tpi10, Tpi25, and Tpi75, we use more than 400 years430
of daily maximum temperature data at 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ spatial resolution representing pre-industrial
climate conditions as available from the ISIMIP2b climate input data set. Based on these more
than 400 years of temperature data we subsequently derive the 99th percentile of the CWMId
distribution under pre-industrial climate conditions. As such, we characterise cold spells as the
mirror of heatwave events (except for the period which we require to be six instead of three435
days).
The results of the analysis indicate an overall reduction of exposure to cold spells under
increasing global mean temperature levels and for younger cohorts (fig. S16a). Except for a few
countries in West Asia, lifetime cold spell exposure reduces consistently across most countries,




Supplementary Figure 1 | Global mean temperature pathways. Historical and future evolu-
tion of global mean temperature (GMT) anomalies relative to the pre-industrial (PI) reference
scenario, taken here as the 1850–1900 average. Shown are three marker scenarios taken from
the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5◦C (54), and 25 additional stylised pathways
used for constructing fig. 2 (see Methods).
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Supplementary Figure 2 | Cross-category lifetime exposure and influence of aggregation
method on exposure sensitivity. (a) Same as fig. 2, but with exposure aggregated by computing
the geometric mean across the exposure multiplication factor (EMF ) per category, (b) Same as
fig. 2, but with exposure aggregated by computing the geometric mean across the lifetime expo-
sure (EXP ), (c) Same as fig. 2, but with exposure aggregated by computing the harmonic mean
across the EMF per category. We note that the second aggregation method (geometric mean
on exposure) yields higher EMF values because the absence of events in one extreme event
category results in zero cross-category exposure in a given country. As this occurs more fre-
quently under pre-industrial control conditions, this leads to unrealistically low global-average
pre-industrial control exposure values and hence artificially high EMF values.
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Supplementary Figure 3 | World Regions. Groups of countries based on (a) geographical
location and (b) income category for which life expectancy data is available (52). The income
groups are defined based on present-day conditions. The region definitions are taken from
the World Bank (112) and abbreviated as follows (see e.g. fig. S10-11): East Asia & Pacific
(EASP), Europe & Central Asia (EUCA), Latin America & Caribbean (LAMC), Middle East &
North Africa (MENA), North America (NAM), South Asia (SAS), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
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Supplementary Figure 4 |Regional lifetime exposure. Same as fig. S2a, but for world regions
shown in fig. S3a.
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Supplementary Figure 5 | Income-based lifetime exposure. Same as fig. S2a, but for income
group regions shown in fig. S3b.
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Supplementary Figure 6 | Local value of global mitigation. (a,b) Heatwave and (c,d) all-
category exposure multiplication factors at the country scale for the 2020 birth cohort relative
to the 1960 birth cohort under (a,c) the current pledges scenario and (b,d) the 1.5 ◦C scenario.
Country-scale exposure multiplication factors aggregate within-country variability in popula-
tion density and land fraction affected by extreme events.
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Supplementary Figure 7 | Country-scale exposure multiplication factors. Same as fig. S6,
but for the extreme event categories (a,b) wildfires, (c,d) crop failures, (e,f) droughts, (g,h)
river floods, and (i,j) tropical cyclones. Country-scale exposure multiplication factors aggregate
within-country variability in population density and land fraction affected by extreme events.
Note that the large tropical cyclone multiplication factors for some world regions with no or very
low numbers of observed tropical cyclone landfalls (e.g. West and Southwest Africa, Western
South America, Western Europe) are based on a small number of simulated tropical cyclones
and should therefore be treated with caution.
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Supplementary Figure 8 | Uneven distribution of lifetime exposure. All-category exposure
multiplication factors across birth cohorts under the current pledges scenario for a range of (a)
geographic regions and (b) income groups (see fig. S3 for the region definitions (112)). The
factors are computed relative to the mean exposure of a reference person with year-1960 life
expectancy under pre-industrial climate conditions. The kink in the curve for the Middle East
and North Africa for cohorts below 20 years in 2020 can be explained by the sudden drop in
life expectancy for these cohorts in Iraq and Syria.
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Supplementary Figure 9 | Exposure increase across world regions. Regional EMFs relative
to the hypothetical pre-industrial reference cohort under 1.5 ◦C, 2.0 ◦C, and current pledges
pathways (colored radial distance) per world region for all extreme event categories (rows) and
cohorts 60, 40, 20, and 0 years old in 2020 (columns). The upper row and angle show the
relative cohort size per region. Note the different radial scale for wildfires and heatwaves.
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Supplementary Figure 10 | Exposure increase across income country groups. Same as
fig. S9 but for income country groups defined in fig. S3b. Note the different radial scale for
wildfires and heatwaves.
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Supplementary Figure 11 | Exposure increase relative to the 1960 birth cohort across in-
come country groups. Same as fig. S9 but using the 1960 birth cohort as reference for the EMF
calculation. Note the different radial scale for heatwaves.
30
Supplementary Figure 12 | Exposure increase relative to the 1960 birth cohort across in-
come country groups. Same as fig. S10 but using the 1960 birth cohort as reference for the
EMF calculation. Note the different radial scale for heatwaves.
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Supplementary Figure 13 | Life expectancy on the rise. Assumed increase in global cohort
life expectancy at birth (adjusted for child mortality 0-4 -– see methods section).
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Supplementary Figure 14 | Drivers of increasing exposure across world regions. All-
category exposure multiplication factors across birth cohorts separated by driver under the
current pledges scenario for a range of geographic regions (see fig. S3a for the region defi-
nitions (112)). As the figure is based on exposure instead of EMF, we use the arithmetic mean
instead of the geometric mean to aggregate the information across the categories.
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Supplementary Figure 15 | Drivers of increasing exposure across income country groups.
Same as fig. S14, but for income country groups defined in fig. S3b. As the figure is based
on exposure instead of EMF, we use the arithmetic mean instead of the geometric mean to
aggregate the information across the categories.
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Supplementary Figure 16 | Cold spell exposure change. (a) Exposure multiplication fac-
tors across birth cohorts (x-axis) under a range of global warming trajectories (fig. S1) reach-
ing 0.87 ◦C to 3.5 ◦C global mean temperature (GMT) anomalies in 2100 relative to the pre-
industrial (PI) reference period (1850–1900; y-axis) for coldwaves. All factors are computed
relative to the mean exposure of a hypothetical reference person living under pre-industrial




Supplementary Table 1 | Definition of extreme events. For each category, the number of
impact models (M.) and future projections (P.) is reported. Further details are provided in the
Methods section and in (37)
Event M. P. Definition of land area exposed
Wildfire 5 53 Annual aggregate of monthly burned land area simulated by global vegeta-
tion models
Crop failure 3 24 Fraction of grid cell where one of the considered crops (maize, wheat, soy
or rice) is grown and the corresponding crop yield falls short of the 2.5th
percentile of the pre-industrial reference distribution; crop-specific land area
fractions are added up.
Drought 8 86 Entire grid cell if monthly soil moisture falls short of the 2.5th percentile of
the preindustrial reference distribution for at least 7 consecutive months.
River Flood 8 86 Flooding is assumed to occur whenever daily discharge (0.5◦ × 0.5◦ resolu-
tion) exceeds the preindustrial 100-year return level (i.e. the 99th percentile);
to derive the associated land area affected per grid cell, simulated runoff is
translated into inundation areas (2.5’× 2.5’ resolution) by CaMa-Flood (68).
Heatwave 1 12 Entire grid cell if the Heat Wave Magnitude Index daily (HWMId) (70, 71)
of that year exceeds the 99th percentile of the HWMId distribution under
pre-industrial climate conditions of that grid cell. The HWMId is defined
as the maximum magnitude of all hot periods occurring in a year, where a
hot period is a period of at least 3 consecutive days with daily maximum
temperature exceeding a threshold value Tpi90 which is defined as the 90th
percentile of daily maximum temperatures under pre-industrial climate con-
ditions, centered on a 31-day window. The magnitude of each hot period in
a year is the sum of the daily magnitudes on the consecutive days composing
the hot period, with daily magnitude calculated according to Md(Td) = 0 if
Td ≤ Tpi25 else (Td− Tpi25)/(Tpi75− Tpi25), where Td is the daily maximum
temperature on day d of the hot period and Tpi25 and Tpi75 are the 25th and
75th percentile, respectively, of the annual maximum of the daily maximum
temperature under pre-industrial climate conditions. To estimate Tpi90, Tpi25,
and Tpi75, we use more than 400 years of daily maximum temperature data at
0.5◦ × 0.5◦ spatial resolution representing pre-industrial climate conditions
as available from the ISIMIP2b climate input data set. Based on these >400
years of temperature data we subsequently derive the 99th percentile of the
HWMId distribution under pre-industrial climate conditions.
Tropical cyclone 1 12 Fraction of grid cell exposed to 1-minute sustained hurricane-force winds
(≥64 kt) at least once a year (0.1◦× 0.1◦ resolution); information re-
quired about wind fields is derived from center location and minimum pres-
sure/maximum wind speed (113, 114).
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Supplementary Table 2 | ISIMIP2b model simulations used for the analysis. Each model
simulation consists of a concatenated historical and future (RCP2.6, 6.0 or 8.5) simulation done
with one impact model (IM) and one global climate model (GCM). The last column indicates
the number of simulation years available from the pre-industrial control simulation (PIcontrol).
For tropical cyclones, each simulation represents the average of a 100-member ensemble of
tropical cyclone tracks downscaled from GCM output (38).
Extreme IM GCM RCP PIcontrol (years)
Wildfires CARAIB GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0 439
Wildfires CARAIB HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0 639
Wildfires CARAIB IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0 639
Wildfires CARAIB MIROC5 2.6, 6.0 639
Wildfires LPJ-GUESS GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Wildfires LPJ-GUESS HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Wildfires LPJ-GUESS IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Wildfires LPJ-GUESS MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Wildfires LPJmL GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Wildfires LPJmL HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Wildfires LPJmL IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Wildfires LPJmL MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Wildfires ORCHIDEE GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 239
Wildfires ORCHIDEE HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 239
Wildfires ORCHIDEE IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Wildfires ORCHIDEE MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 239
Wildfires VISIT GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Wildfires VISIT IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Wildfires VISIT MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Crop failures GEPIC GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0 439
Crop failures GEPIC HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0 639
Crop failures GEPIC IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0 639
Crop failures GEPIC MIROC5 2.6, 6.0 639
Crop failures LPJmL GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0 439
Crop failures LPJmL HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0 639
Crop failures LPJmL IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0 639
Crop failures LPJmL MIROC5 2.6, 6.0 639
Crop failures PEPIC GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0 439
Crop failures PEPIC HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0 639
Crop failures PEPIC IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0 639
Crop failures PEPIC MIROC5 2.6, 6.0 639
Droughts CLM4.5 GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 239
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Table 2 continued from previous page
Extreme IM GCM RCP PIcontrol (years)
Droughts CLM4.5 HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 239
Droughts CLM4.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 239
Droughts CLM4.5 MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 239
Droughts H08 GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Droughts H08 HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts H08 IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts H08 MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts LPJmL GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Droughts LPJmL HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts LPJmL IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts LPJmL MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts JULES-W1 GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Droughts JULES-W1 HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts JULES-W1 IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts JULES-W1 MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts MPI-HM GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0 439
Droughts MPI-HM IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0 639
Droughts MPI-HM MIROC5 2.6, 6.0 639
Droughts ORCHIDEE GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Droughts ORCHIDEE HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Droughts ORCHIDEE IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts ORCHIDEE MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Droughts PCR-GLOBWB GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0 439
Droughts PCR-GLOBWB HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0 639
Droughts PCR-GLOBWB IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0 639
Droughts PCR-GLOBWB MIROC5 2.6, 6.0 639
Droughts WaterGAP2 GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Droughts WaterGAP2 HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts WaterGAP2 IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Droughts WaterGAP2 MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods CLM4.5 GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods CLM4.5 HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods CLM4.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods CLM4.5 MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods H08 GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods H08 HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods H08 IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods H08 MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
39
Table 2 continued from previous page
Extreme IM GCM RCP PIcontrol (years)
River floods LPJmL GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods LPJmL HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods LPJmL IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods LPJmL MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods JULES-W1 GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods JULES-W1 HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods JULES-W1 IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods JULES-W1 MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods MPI-HM GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0 439
River floods MPI-HM IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0 639
River floods MPI-HM MIROC5 2.6, 6.0 639
River floods ORCHIDEE GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods ORCHIDEE HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods ORCHIDEE IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods ORCHIDEE MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods PCR-GLOBWB GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0 439
River floods PCR-GLOBWB HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0 639
River floods PCR-GLOBWB IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0 639
River floods PCR-GLOBWB MIROC5 2.6, 6.0 639
River floods WaterGAP2 GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
River floods WaterGAP2 HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods WaterGAP2 IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
River floods WaterGAP2 MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Heatwaves HWMId-humidex GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Heatwaves HWMId-humidex HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Heatwaves HWMId-humidex IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Heatwaves HWMId-humidex MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Tropical cyclones KE-TG-meanfield GFDL-ESM2M 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Tropical cyclones KE-TG-meanfield HadGEM2-ES 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 439
Tropical cyclones KE-TG-meanfield IPSL-CM5A-LR 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
Tropical cyclones KE-TG-meanfield MIROC5 2.6, 6.0, 8.5 639
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